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I. INTRODUCTION
Imperfect transactions are promises or assertions insufficiently
supported by the accouterments of formalized agreements to be
enforceable as contracts. Lack of mutual consideration, discovery of
mutual mistake, fraud, or other misrepresentation, disasters intervening
between promise and performance, and illusory promises are the types
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comments were prepared in response to the most recent drafts of articles in this
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to comment favorably on the excellent contributions contained in the published version
of each paper, the author expresses his regrets.
of imperfections that shift our attention away from conventional
remedies in contract. When the promisor's conduct is also tortious,
conventional tort remedies may also be inappropriate. There is no
unified theory of remedies for imperfect transactions.
The papers by Professors DeLong, Wonnell, and Kelly in this
Symposium address different types of imperfect transactions. Promises
that are the subject of section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts are imperfect in the sense that they lack consideration or are
disclaimed in subsequent, formalized, written contracts.' Section 90
authorizes courts to find remedies for reasonable but fruitless
expenditures induced by parties who make promises on which they
should reasonably expect others to rely.2 Professor DeLong decries
courts' formalist strategies for enforcing disclaimers that eliminate these
promisors' potential liability for intentionally imperfect transactions.'
Taking Professor DeLong's analysis of imperfect promises one step
further sheds light on his critique of formalist analysis of disclaimers. I
will hypothesize a rationale for disclaimers and alternative methods for
limiting their application that might be appealing to both Professor
DeLong and the formalist courts.
The transactions I have described as "imperfect" are not contracts that
are breached. They are transactions that are not enforceable as contracts.
Professor Wonnell surveys the reasons why a contracting party might
change her mind after promising and before performing in order to
consider appropriate remedies for each case.' Of his six cases,' four are
cases of breach and two involve imperfect transactions as I have just
defined that term. Professor Wonnell agrees that an expectation-based
damage rule is appropriate in all but the two imperfect transaction cases. 6
Since I start with the premise that an expectation-based remedy is
appropriate in all cases where the court "enforces" a contract, I will
focus my reaction on those two "imperfection" cases. I hope my
comments will sharpen the definition of these two classes of cases with
which Professor Wonnell is concerned. I will also explain why it is
likely to be more fruitful to consider those two cases as examples of
imperfect transactions rather than as examples of contract breach.
When one party's misrepresentation causes another to suffer a
1. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
2. Id.
3. Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: Some Realism About the
New Formalism (with Particular Reference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 13, 16 (2001).
4. Christopher T. Wonnell, Expectation, Reliance, and the Two Contractual
Wrongs, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 53, 59 (2001).
5. Id. at 60-79.
6. Id. at 90-91.
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detriment, the interaction between the two may be described as an
imperfect transaction. The misrepresentation may induce the other to
assent to an agreement or otherwise rely on the other's assertion. In
neither case is there an enforceable contract. Whether the result of the
misrepresentation is an unenforceable contract or a less formal
transaction, the harm done by the misrepresentation calls for a remedy in
tort or contract. Professor Kelly describes remedies for this sort of
imperfect transaction in the larger context of comparing tort remedies to
contract remedies.7 As I am in complete agreement with his conclusions,
I will make several arguments that I believe strengthen his argument that
tort and contract remedies are both based on the expectation interest! I
will demonstrate how tort damages may be calculated using remedial
rules taken from the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. It is not surprising that Professor Kelly chose
misrepresentation as the most likely candidate in tort law for a break
from the conventional expectation measure of damages
Misrepresentation results in an imperfect transaction analogous to those
involving gratuitous promises, mutual mistake, impracticability, and
unconscionability. These are all defective transactions for which there is
no coherent unifying remedial theory.
II. A RATIONALE FOR DISCLAIMERS AND THEiR ENFORCEMENT
Professor DeLong's article is concerned with sophisticated business
people eliminating their potential liability under a promissory estoppel
theory."0 His article offers a detailed account of how clever drafters and
formalist courts may deny plaintiffs their recompense by using certain
drafting and interpretive strategies. If Professor DeLong's sympathy for
the plaintiffs were not so clear, one might suspect that his was a
surreptitious "I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him" speech." While
7. Michael B. Kelly, The Phanton Reliance Interest in Tort Damages, 38 SAN
DIEGOL. REv. 169, 170-71 (2001).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 170-76.
10. DeLong, supra note 3, at 16.
11. In William Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, Marc Antony offers a speech to his
fellow Romans in which, under the cover of scorn, Antony praises Caesar. WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2. The speech begins with the words "[friends,
Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears; I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him. The
evil that men do lives after them; the good is oft internd with their bones-So let it be
with Caesar." Id. Under the cover of decrying the evil perpetrated by formalist courts,
decrying the triumph of formalism over realism in the courts that support
disclaimers of liability, Professor DeLong graciously draws a clear map
for those who wish to limit the reach of section 90 liability.
I will develop two themes. The first offers a relatively simple
rationale for enforcing disclaimers that avoids Professor DeLong's
critique and supports the outcome of the courts' formalist analysis. The
second is an alternative perspective on the courts' legal analysis, which
helps identify which disclaimers should not be enforced.
A. Interpreting Section 90
Formalist courts enforce disclaimers by insisting that the language of
people's promises ought to be taken seriously. Professor DeLong
characterizes the formalist approach as applying rules literally, without
reference to the underlying policies or purposes of rules. 2 By contrast,
the realist approach is more openly normative and provides a closer fit
between legal purposes and legal effects. Should the intent of promise
disclaimers be considered for section 90 purposes? 3
Courts might ignore intent if a contract is unconscionable, but what if,
as in section 90 cases, there is no contract?'4 The literal text of section
90 does not look at the intent of the promisor to be bound by his
promises, damage for detrimental reliance may be awarded without
regard to the promisor's intent. If the promisor's intent is irrelevant, his
disclaimer is irrelevant.
A formalist would be especially eager to see if other parts of the
relevant statute, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in this instance,
shed any light on the relevance of intent. Section 21, "Intention to Be
Legally Bound," appears among other rules related to the formation of
contracts. By its context within the Restatement, section 21 applies to
situations involving mutual assent, rather than to gratuitous, noncontractual
promises of the type covered in section 90. Section 21 has two points.
The first is that unsophisticated parties who do not know that they are
legally bound by their words and acts may be bound despite their
ignorance. The second is that sophisticated parties are not legally bound
if they agree not to be legally bound.'5 The second point is most relevant
Professor DeLong describes the path would-be disclaimers must take. DeLong, supra
note 3, at 21-29.
12. DeLong, supra note 3, at 18.
13. Rather than applying to breaches of "contract," section 90 applies to breaches
of "promise." See REsTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 90(1) (1981).
14. Section 90, comment a, refers to these cases as "half-completed exchange[s]."
Id., § 90 cmt. a.
15. Section 21 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts reads as follows: "Neither
real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation
[VOL. 38: 193, 2001] Remedies for Imperfect Transactions
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
here. Section 21 places a high value on manifestations of intention in
contract formation. It might be that there is no logical reason for such a
rule to apply to section 90 promises, because the rule comes from the
context of contract formation that requires a manifestation of assent.' Is
there any logical reason to import the respect for a promisor's intent to
section 90 promises?
Before looking for justifications for importing section 21 values into
section 90, note that the Restatement recognizes that parties' statements
may turn otherwise enforceable contracts into imperfect transactions. A
party's unilateral declaration that it will not be bound and agreements
between parties that one of them will not be bound both raise the
possibility that a court will decline to enforce the agreement because the
disclaimer creates an imperfect transaction. The court may decline to
enforce all or part of the agreement on a variety of grounds. While such
agreements are given effect:
[They] may present difficult questions of interpretation: it may mean that no
bargain has been reached, or that a particular manifestation of intention is not a
promise; it may reserve a power to revoke or terminate a promise under certain
circumstances but not others. In a written document prepared by one party it
may raise a question of misrepresentation or mistake or overreaching; to avoid
such questions it may be read against the party who prepared it.17
This language, which seems equally relevant to section 90 promises as
to section 21 agreements, suggests that there is no problem with
disclaimers per se. It may be that the problem with disclaimers is
with the way they are phrased, contextually framed, or imposed on the
other party. If so, the solution is either to recognize only those
disclaimers that do not raise questions of misrepresentation, mistake, or
overreaching, or to adopt the conventional approach of interpreting
ambiguous language against the drafter of the disclaimer.
If courts are to choose which disclaimers to enforce, they need a way
to distinguish among them. Are there legitimate reasons for disclaimers
or are they inevitably abusive? If there are legitimate purposes for
disclaimers, perhaps we should respect the promisor's intentions. Is
there any reason to import section 21's solicitude for the promisor's
of a contract, but a manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal
relations may prevent the formation of a contract." RESTATEIENT, supra note 1. § 21
(1981).
16. See RESTATMNT (SEcOND) oi CONTRACTS. Chap. 3. Formation of Contracts-
Mutual Assent.
17. RESTATEMENT(SECoND) OF CoNarTS § 21 cmt. b.
intent into section 90? It is easy to imagine that section 90 might have
been designed to shift losses, create incentives, or somehow affect
behavior. When might one or both parties want to avoid the promisor's
section 90 liability? By disclaiming liability, a promisor shifts to the
promisee the risk of his not following through on his promise,18 which
might mean the risk of his not fulfilling his gratuitous promise. 9 He also
shifts the risk of failing to reach an agreement with the other2°and the
risk that prior negotiations and superseded bargaining positions will be
confused with the final contractual obligations.2 Is it legitimate to ask
who should bear these risks?
Section 90 is often viewed from a torts perspective because courts
award damages only when the promisee's expenditures were reasonable.
Curiously, it does not matter whether the promisor acted reasonably or
not. All that is required is that the promisor could reasonably have
foreseen the other's reliance. Whether it was reasonable to make the
promise does not matter. This is a curious mixture of obligations
making the promisor liable without regard to fault, but limiting the
promisee's recovery only if she was negligent. Given this mixture, what
can the promisor do to share or shift the risks of a reasonable promise?
From a torts perspective, the promisee's reliance is reasonable if the
benefits of her preperformance reliance exceed the probability of the
promisor's nonperformance times the associated loss if there is
nonperformance. How can the promisee avoid these losses? How can
the promisor avoid them?
When allocation of risk is discussed, we naturally consider the
possibility that one person may be in a better position to insure against
risks than another. The promisor can avoid the wasted costs of early
investment by the promisee by declining to promise or by disclaiming.
The benefit of disclaiming to the promisor is clear; he will be more
willing to promise. The promisee may also benefit from the disclaimer
by obtaining the promise more inexpensively or more readily. A
18. The idea that risk allocation is a fundamental part of contracting is hardly
original. "Ordinary commercial contracts also shift risks, and thus provide a form of
insurance." Wonnell, supra note 4, at 104 n.173 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER,
EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 116 (5th ed. 1998)).
19. See, e.g., Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 287 P.2d 735, 738 (Wash. 1955);
DeLong, supra note 3, at 25-26.
20. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 272 (Wis. 1965);
Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); DeLong, supra note
3, at 24.
21. See, e.g., Arlington Fin. Corp. v. Ben Franklin Bank of Ill., No. 98 C 7068,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1690, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Feb 10, 1999); Puri v. Blockbuster Music
Retail, Inc., No. 95 C 50018, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18819, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20,
1995); W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Taco Tico Acquisition Corp., 454 S.E.2d 789, 790
(Ga. Ct. App. 1995); DeLong, supra note 3, at 28.
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promisee may also be in a better position to evaluate the risks because
she knows the nature and extent of her potentially profitable reliance and
knows what precautions she can take to insure that her reliance
expenditures are not wasted in the event of nonperformance or
nonagreement. She knows the risks and can insure against them. It is
easy to imagine that the promisee is the better avoider of risks. The
promisee is either beginning performance or incurring surplus-enhancing
expenses and is likely to be in the best position to judge their worthiness.
While the promisor has a better estimate of his own probability of not
performing his gratuitous promise, he may not be in a better position to
know whether negotiations will be successful or whether negotiations
might lead to confusion about the terms of the final contract. Allowing
disclaimers recognizes the possibility that the promisee may be the best
cost avoider and permits parties to allocate that risk to the promisee.
Section 90 provides insurance against not reaching agreement,
confusion about contract terms, or failure of the promisor to perform.
The disclaimer says that the promisor is not going to pay for this
insurance and implicitly warns the promisee to take steps to encourage
agreement, avoid confusion, and invest prudently in reliance
expenditures. Courts might sensibly recognize the desirability of risk
shifting. A promisee might reasonably rely despite a disclaimer. The
potential gains may be sufficient to justify reliance without the
promisor's insurance coverage. If the promisee relies after receiving a
disclaimer, it may be and presumably is because it was reasonable to
rely given the reputation and economic interests of the other and the
promisee's own benefits of relying. Courts may promote exchange and
enhance the value of promising by enforcing disclaimers in such cases.
Courts do not usually question the allocation of risk if it is not
unconscionable. Perhaps Professor DeLong is primarily concerned with
the imperfect transactions he chose to discuss because they are
unconscionable. Given the potential for misrepresentation, mistake, and
overreaching identified by comment b, section 21 of Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, we should consider which disclaimers ought to be
enforced and which should not be recognized.
B. Which Disclaimers Should Be Enforced?
Perhaps the fundamental objection to disclaimers is that they are
hidden or poorly understood or appreciated. Professor DeLong
identifies three types of disclaimers: (1) embedded, (2) peremptory, and
(3) postpromise disclaimers.22  Embedded disclaimers are those
accompanying a promise, but overwhelmed, sensorially, by language
describing the promise. In Spooner v. Reserve Life Insurance Co.,23 the
court denied agents their promised bonuses because of the embedded
disclaimer. If the agents were induced to stay with the company and
work harder because of the disclaimed promise, "it was because they
were relying on the corporate conscience of the appellant and not upon
an enforcible [sic] contract."24 It is not unreasonable to rely on the
reputation or conscience of another; those factors provide some
guarantee of performance even if they provide no compensation.
Professor DeLong objects to the interpretive mechanisms used by
courts in the embedded disclaimer cases. He complains about the
outcome (enforcing the disclaimer) by criticizing the courts'
methodology. He does not evaluate the reasons for the disclaimer. He
objects that the court enforced the plain language of the disclaimer rather
than looking at the language of the contract as a whole. Professor
DeLong argues that the announcement was ambiguously inconsistent,
"should be given a meaning that is consistent with the express promises"
that "should be deemed to have been superceded by the promises that
followed," and "should be deemed inoperative as a matter of law."" He
faults the promise as unconscionable or procedurally defective, saying
that the disclaimer was "sandwiched between statements that are
unqualified commitments."26 The court itself acknowledges that the
announcement was a "one-sided proposition[]."'  All of this language
suggests that the promise was in some way unconscionable. Unfairness
calls for remedial action, but that does not mean that all disclaimers
should be rejected. Professor DeLong claims that the disclaimer
accompanying a promise should be inoperative as a matter of law, but
offers no argument for that position.28 He does not consider when a
promisor might want to offer a lower level of guarantee (reputation and
conscience) than full damages or whether a promisee might prefer a
poorly guaranteed promise to no promise at all.
A peremptory disclaimer purportedly nullifies all other promises,
"whenever they were uttered."29 These disclaimers typically require that
a written, signed agreement accompany all promises enforceable by
22. DeLong, supra note 3, at 25-30.
23. 287 P.2d 735 (Wash. 1955).
24. Id. at 738.
25. See DeLong, supra note 3, at 27.
26. Id, at 26.
27. 287 P.2d at 738.
28. DeLong, supra note 3, at 27.
29. Id. at 28.
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damages. Where a party or parties intend not to be bound by unwritten
promises, courts hold that it is unreasonable to rely on unwritten
promises. Professor DeLong says that courts follow three types of
senseless strategies to come to this conclusion.-" The first strategy is
following a formalist fiction about the state of mind of the promisee.
Courts seem to assume, contrary to reason, that promisees understand
from the context that promises are meaningless.' The second and third
strategies involve courts' use of formalist interpretive constructions.
The constructions include such absurdities as disclaimers are never
superseded by later language and disclaimers always trump
commitments.3 It is important to recognize the flaws in courts' legal
analysis. The next step, however, should be taken with caution. Should
all disclaimers in section 90 cases be ignored?
If courts recognize alternative approaches to imperfect transactions
and legitimate justifications for disclaimers, they might sensibly enforce
some peremptory disclaimers. The strategies Professor DeLong
identifies are complaints about the fairness of the disclaimer. If
promisees do not understand that promises are meaningless, if the
promisor's language is ambiguous, if the disclaimer is contextually
superseded by subsequent promises, or if the language actually suggests
that the disclaimer trumps the promise, perhaps the disclaimers should
be ignored. But they should be ignored because the transaction was
imperfect, not because disclaimers are inevitably abusive. These types
of strategies are better analyzed as procedural defects that might lead to
a conclusion that the purported contract is unconscionable and should
therefore be treated as an imperfect transaction. A less cynical
commentator, hypothesizing that there is a legitimate purpose for
disclaimers, might characterize the promisor's statement as follows:
"These promises are intended to be uninsured, and that is why I didn't
bother to make a binding commitment here" or "There are risks
associated with assuming that this promise will be fulfilled and the
promisee agrees to accept those risks." This presumption seems entirely
sensible in some situations and a sufficient reason for recognizing some
30. Id. at29-31.
31. Id. at29-30.
32. ld. at 30.
33. Id-
34. Professor DeLong briefly discusses the utility of disclaimers without
commenting on whether the utility justifies enforcing such disclaimers or identifying
which should be enforced. That, of course, is not his mission in this paper.
disclaimers. The bottom line is that there are two questions involved in
deciding whether a disclaimer should be recognized. The first is
whether all disclaimers are evil. The second is whether, given the
context of the transaction, a particular disclaimer should be recognized.
The most powerful, postpromise disclaimers are those contained in
binding, completely integrated agreements discharging prior promises
inconsistent with the agreement. In Professor DeLong's sample case, a
later disclaimer by the promisor before the promisee's reliance made
subsequent reliance unreasonable. This seems appropriate. Professor
DeLong identifies nothing about disclaimers that justifies a departure
from the general rule governing binding, completely integrated
agreements.
Critical analyses of court holdings are immensely important,
especially when the holdings are contrary to widely accepted rules such
as liability under a promissory estoppel theory. It is particularly
valuable for commentators such as Professor DeLong to remind
academia that the rules as written do not always reflect the way rules
apply in practice. In their 1936 article The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 1, L.L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, Jr. observed:
T[he] proposition that legal rules can be understood only with reference to
the purposes they serve would today scarcely be regarded as an exciting
truth .... We are still all too willing to embrace the conceit that it is possible to
manipulate legal concepts without the orientation which comes from the simple
inquiry: toward what end is this activity directed? Nietzsche's observation, that
the most common stupidity consists in forgetting what one is trying to do,
retains a discomforting relevance to legal science.
35
Our understanding of the role of disclaimers in contract law and the
law's remedial responses to unconscionable disclaimers would certainly
benefit from more than the sketchy analysis I have given it here.
III. REMEDIES FOR IMPERFECT TRANSACTIONS
In order to develop a theory of remedies for breach of contract,
Professor Wonnell explores six reasons why a contracting party might
change her mind after promising and before performing. 6 For Cases 1
through 4, he concludes that the traditional expectation measure of
damages is appropriate. 7  Cases 5 and 6, by contrast, present
complications that raise concerns about applying the usual measure."
35. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 52 (1936).
36. Wonnell, supra note 4, at 60-79.
37. Id. at 60-71.
38. Id. at 72-79.
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These situations, unlike Cases 1 through 4, involve imperfect
transactions, promises that are insufficiently supported by the
accouterments of formalized agreements to be enforceable as contracts.
The challenge is to find a remedy to fit these cases.
In Professor Wonnell's Cases 5 and 6, the missing accouterments
relate to the underlying theoretical assumptions that support
enforcement. Formation defenses, such as duress, undue influence,
mistake, fraud, incapacity due to intoxication, immaturity, or mental
illness, are all examples of pure procedural defects creating imperfect
transactions without regard to whether other formalities, such as
consideration or the requirement of a signed writing, are met. Where
those procedural defects are present, the contract was formed under
conditions unlike the "meeting of the minds" standard suggested as the
model for contract formation. We rely on this meeting of the minds to
assure us that both parties believed they would be made better off by
contracting. When the model for contract formation is not matched, we
do not know whether both parties are being made better off by
contracting or not. The question is, how should courts respond to these
cases?
The personal and social desirability of voluntary exchange rests on a
number of assumptions. The first is that exchange is voluntary. If
people are not permitted to express and act on their preferences
regarding an exchange, there is no reason to think that the exchange
makes them better off. Doctrines of duress, coercion, and undue
influence respond to this imperfection. The second is that people are
able to obtain and rationally evaluate information. If people do not
appreciate the implications of a proposed exchange, either because of
insufficient information or insufficient ability to process that
information, there is no assurance that the exchange will improve their
well-being. The doctrines of mistake, impracticability, and impossibility
respond to these concerns. The third assumption is that the exchange
has no detrimental effect on people who are not party to the exchange.
Here the social and personal analyses diverge. An exchange may benefit
the contracting parties but have disastrous effects on other members of
society. When this third assumption is not met, courts void contracts as
being contrary to public policy. Contract law recognizes exceptions to
the general rule of enforceability of contracts when these assumptions
are violated. Professor Wonnell's analysis of appropriate remedies may
appropriately be extended to all of these unenforced agreements. Taking
that more global position suggests a search for a coherent set of remedial
responses other than expectation damages that is appropriate in all of
these examples of imperfect transactions.
Professor Wonnell offers the strongest argument for an alternative to
expectation damages in cases of impracticability and mistake, cases
where courts conclude that performance should be at least partially
excused. For the purpose of developing a coherent set of remedial
responses, this is a useful beginning. The difference Professor Wonnell
identifies in Case 4 between exploiting existing ignorance (the farmer
who does not know there is oil under his land), and creating new
ignorance (the lender with confusing credit terms) is quite sensible.
Professor Wonnell recommends the expectation measure of damages in
the first situation, because a social function is served by new
information,39 and the reliance measure in the second case, because no
social function is served by imperfect transactions. 4' The difficulty
presented by "new ignorance" is the problem posed by the imperfect
transactions in Cases 5 and 6.
Professor Wonnell offers Case 5 as an example of mutual mistake,4'
but neither illustration seems to fit that category. Both Dumb and
Dumber believe that the rock that is the subject matter of the contract is
the Hope Diamond. Professor Wonnell's hypothetical case has a
mistake on both sides because it refers to an erroneous belief relating to
the facts as they exist at the time of making the contract.42 But Dumb
and Dumber did not make a mutual mistake that is recognized by the
common law because the risk of error was contractually allocated to
Dumb. The risk was allocated to Dumb because Dumb said, "I
guarantee that this is the Hope Diamond."'3 Professor Wonnell's actual
case has neither a mutual mistake nor an unallocated risk. According to
Professor Wonnell, both Chatlos Systems, Inc. and the National Cash
Register Corporation (hereinafter "NCR") believed that a six-function
accounting system could profitably be installed for $46,020.'
39. Id. at 66, 69-70.
40. Id. at 70.
41. Id. at 72-75. These categorizations are, for the most part, mine. Because he
was attempting to make a larger point, Professor Wonnell made no attempt to fit his
cases into the typical Restatement categories. I find the Restatement categories useful
because my comments illustrate that Professor Wonnell's arguments are most powerful
when applied to those categories of imperfect transactions rather than applied to cases of
contract breach.
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 cmt. a (1981) (defining
mistake).
43. Wonnell, supra note 4, at 73; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154
(a) (1981) (describing who bears the risk of a mistake).
44. Wonnell, supra note 4, at 74; Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp.,
670 F.2d 1304, 1307-08 (3d Cir. 1982) (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
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Technically, this is not a mistake for NCR because it is a prediction or
judgment as to events to occur in the future.'5 But even if it is a mutual
mistake, the risk might reasonably be allocated to NCR either because
NCR decided to proceed with the installation, treating its limited
knowledge about the costs of installation as sufficient, or because the
court might hold that it is reasonable to allocate the risk to the party in
the best position to evaluate and avoid it, which would be the installer.'
As the Introductory Note to chapter 11 of Restatement (Second) of
Contracts points out, "[i]t is an accepted maxim that pacta sunt
servanda, contracts are to be kept."0  The mutual mistake doctrine
adheres to the allocation of risk stated in the contract.
Assuming that these are mutual mistake cases, however, consider the
underlying principle Professor Wonnell illustrates. Case 5 is, according
to Professor Wonnell's heading, a mistake that makes the contract more
burdensome to the promisor and correspondingly more profitable to the
promisee." It may be that neither case fits the model. If we ignore
Dumb's guarantee, the fact that the rock is not the Hope Diamond does
not make relinquishing the rock more burdensome to the promisor,
Dumb. And the mistake makes the delivery less rather than more
profitable to the promisee, Dumber, once he discovers it is just a rock.
Dumb and Dumber do not illustrate Professor Wonnell's point.
The facts of Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp."  fit
the model only slightly better. The mistake does make performance
much more burdensome to NCR, because it must invent and install a
much fancier system. But would the fancier system be "correspondingly
more profitable to the promisee"? If Chatlos; will gain no more
advantage from the fancy system than from the one promised, the
mistake makes the promise no more profitable (unless we consider that,
after NCR installs it, Chatlos rips it out and resells it on the open
market). Imagine that Chatlos would have been willing to pay as much
45. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) oF CONTRACTS § 151 Cmt. a (defining mistake).
46. See id. § 154(b)-(c) (describing who bears the risk of a mistake).
47. ld. ch. 11, introductory note, at 309.
The obligor who does not wish to undertake so extensive an obligation may
contract for a lesser one by using one of a variety of common clauses: he may
agree only to use his "best efforts"; ... he may reserve a right to cancel the
contract; [or] he may use a flexible pricing arrangement such as a "cost plus"
term ....
Id. at 309. All of these options would have been available to NCL
48. Wonnell, supra note 4, at 72.
49. 670 F.2d 1304, 1307-08 (3d Cir. 1982).
as $56,020 for the promised system and felt they had obtained a good
deal paying only $46,020 for it. If they get a system that performs as
promised but costs NCR' $201,826.50 to build, Chatlos's profit is still
only $10,000. According to the court's opinion, the figure $201,826.50
was the difference between the fair market price of the system as
promised ($207,826.50) and the value of the goods as delivered
($6000).5o This calculation does not reflect the value of the system to
Chatlos, because they planned to use the system, not resell it. They
might never have been willing to pay $207,000 for the services the
system would have delivered. Thus neither Dumb and Dumber nor
Chatlos are examples of the principle Professor Wonnell seeks to
illustrate. The principle and his observation that expectation damages
seem inappropriate in some situations is sound and constructive. Those
situations are bona fide cases of mutual mistake and cases of
impracticability and impossibility.
Professor Wonnell offers Case 6 as a case of efficient breach." He
concludes that expectation damages are not an appropriate remedy in
such cases. 2 Case 6 involves a mistake that makes the contract more
burdensome than anticipated to the promisor (like Case 5) without
becoming correspondingly more profitable to the promisee." Professor
Wonnell offers an example of inefficient performance that fits this
description. The driller's costs double without creating any benefit for
the promisee. It is a case where breach is efficient, but not a prototypical
case. Wonnell's example is a case closer to the impracticability or
impossibility situation, which demonstrates that it, like Case 5, is an
example of an imperfect transaction. Both are unenforceable contracts."
50. Id. at 1305 n.2. This calculation is demanded by the general provisions for
breach of warranty, which asks for the difference between "the value of the goods
accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted." U.C.C. § 2-
714(2) (1989). The facts of this case make it appealing for Professor Wonnell's point
that there is a great windfall to the promisee. It is the court's improper, though common,
interpretation of the word "value" that gives this case its utility to Professor Wonnell. If
the court had been applying the expectation measure of damages, it would have
interpreted "value" as the benefits NCR's installation of the computer system would
bring to Chatlos. To avoid making the promisee better off than performance would have
done (which would be contrary to U.C.C. § 1-106(1), which requires that "the aggrieved
party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed." U.C.C.
§ 1-106(1) (1989), the court must consider the difference in surplus or profit Chatlos
received from the goods accepted and the goods as promised. I discuss this interpretive
difficulty briefly below, see infra Section IV (discussion of Professor Kelly's article),
and at greater length in David W. Bames, The Meaning of Value in Contract Damages
and Contract Theory, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1996).
51. See Wonnell, supra note 4, at 75-79.
52. See id. at 78-79.
53. See id. at 75.
54. Similarly, Professor Wonnell refers to two of George M. Cohen's
categorizations of types of breaches as "efficient breach" scenarios: contracts that should
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The prototypical case of efficient breach is one where the promisor
has discovered an alternative use for his performance that gives him a
greater profit.5 That use is prototypically a sale to another buyer who
values the seller's performance more highly than does the promisee.
The existence of that alternative raises the seller's opportunity cost,
making the contract more burdensome than anticipated, without
affecting the value the promisee attaches to performance. In the
prototypical efficient breach case, breach is desirable because the
alternative use is more valuable than the promised use; the alternative
buyer is willing to pay more for the good or service than is the promisee.
The rock drilling case is more like the impracticability cases. They are,
technically, efficient breach cases because it is more desirable not to
perform than to perform. But in the impracticability cases, like the
drilling case, it is more efficient to let the resource (drilling services) lie
idle than to drill holes in this rock.
Professor Wonnell's example helps us distinguish impracticability, an
excuse from performance for which a nonexpectation remedy might be
appropriate, from other cases of efficient breach, for which expectation
remains appropriate. To appreciate the distinction, we must recognize
that each party has an anticipated surplus or profit and each has
not have been made and contracts that should not be performed. See id. at 106. 1 think
including all such contracts under the "efficient breach" heading is deceptive. The
classification is unhelpful because, for both types of contracts, we would enforce some
contracts and not others. With respect to those that should not be performed, my
objection is that the category includes not only the prototypical efficient breach cases,
described in the text accompanying this note, but also those involving impracticability
for which another remedy might be appropriate. We enforce some efficient breach cases
with the expectation measure of damages. But we do not enforce the impractical or
impossible contracts. We treat them differently because they are imperfect transactions,
along with other situations in which promises are unenforceable. With respect to those
cases involving promises that should not have been made, some would be enforceable
and others not. Some are contracts where we know performance is inefficient and some
are contracts where we cannot know. Consider promises made by people lacking
capacity; a rationale for voiding such contracts is that we do not know whether the
exchange was efficient or not because one of the parties was incompetent to determine
whether the exchange would make himself or herself better off. That rationale is
appealing because we do enforce contracts by incompetents for necessities, which
logically will make them better off. But that rationale is quite different from the efficient
breach story, where we know performance is undesirable. Again, we would expect
different remedies for voidable contracts than for efficient breaches of contract: hence
my suggestion that we change the categories. Rather than treating efficient breach cases
differently from other reasons, I suggest we focus on treating imperfect transactions
differently from enforceable contracts.
55. See, e.g., Wonnell, supra note 4, at 82.
anticipated costs. In the prototypical efficient breach case, the breaching
promisor earns more than his anticipated surplus, enough more to
compensate the promisee for his anticipated but unrealized surplus, to
transfer the resource to a more productive use, and, probably, to create
additional surplus in the hands of the third party buyer. The expectation
remedy would encourage the promisor to perform, even at a loss, if his
loss is less than the promisee's gain. If the promisor does not perform,
he must pay in damages an amount equal to the promisee's anticipated
gain, so he is better off performing. It is only when the promisor's loss
is greater than the promisee's gain that declining to perform is efficient.
That means not only that the promisor fails to earn a profit, but that he
suffers a loss greater than the promisee's gain. This is a dramatic shift
from what the parties anticipated at the time of contract formation.
Perhaps this is what impracticability means. 6
Professor Wonnell's illustration of Case 6 has these characteristics of
what might, from an efficient breach perspective, be an impracticability
case. At the time of contract formation, the owner and driller each
anticipated a $250 profit. At the time performance was due, the driller's
profit would have been -$1000, which means, not only does he earn no
profit, he would be $1000 in the hole, so to speak. The amount of the
driller's loss is greater than the owner's anticipated profit. This is a
contract that has not merely become unprofitable to the promisor, but
has wiped out all of society's interest in enforcing the contract. This
56. The efficiency of a particular breach is, of course, more complicated than the
simple examples suggest. As I have discussed elsewhere, a breach may entail a variety
of offsetting benefits that are properly weighed against the detriments. An exhaustive
list of the detrimental effects of the breach to the promisee includes: (a) the surplus the
promisor would have earned from performing for the promisee offset by the surplus to
the promisor from the alternative use; (b) the surplus the promisee would have earned
from the promisor's performance offset by any surplus he can obtain from substitute
performance; (c) the costs incurred by the promisee in beginning his performance for the
promisor prior to the promisor's breach offset by any benefits either the promisee or
promisor obtained from that performance; (d) the costs incurred by the promisee prior to
breach in an attempt to enhance the surplus he expected to obtain from the promisor's
performance offset by any benefit the promisee obtained from those expenses; (e) the
breach-related costs (consequential or incidental, in the Restatement § 349 sense,
including litigation costs); (f) the performance costs incurred by the promisor prior to
breach offset by any benefit the promisor or promisee obtained from that performance;
and (g) the costs incurred by the promisor prior to breach to enhance the promisee's
anticipated performance offset by any benefit the promisor obtains. All of these
variables must be considered by the party contemplating breach and facing an
expectation damage award and by the court in awarding damages. See David W. Barnes,
The Anatomy of Contract Damages and Efficient Breach Theory, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 397, 489-90 (1998) (demonstrating the equivalence between the conditions
necessary for profitable breach and for efficient breach under the expectation measure of
damages). The efficiency of breach in the impracticability context is, therefore, a more
complicated question than the simple efficiency-based rule suggests.
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seems to be what Professor Wonnell means by a "serious mistake" in his
motivation for breaking a particular contract."
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, what separates
the impracticability and impossibility cases from the efficient breach
cases is that, in the former, "[a]n extraordinary circumstance may make
performance so vitally different from what was reasonably to be
expected as to alter the essential nature of that performance." '
Comment d of section 261 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
states that "[p]erformance may be impracticable because extreme and
unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss to one of the parties will
be involved."'59 Those extraordinary circumstances are, however,
elsewhere in the Restatement described as "disasters,"' O from which
perspective the proposed, efficient breach-based definition of
impracticability seems a little lax. But like Professor Wonnell's
principle, the traditional view of impracticability and impossibility cases
envisions a loss to the promisor and no gain to the promisee.
"Fairness" is another reason for separating the impracticability cases
from other examples of efficient breach. While the prototypical case of
efficient breach elicits no sympathy for the promisor, the
impracticability and mistake cases do. Some commentators have
suggested that the promisor who benefits from an efficient breach should
be required to share his augmented surplus with the promisee.6' But it is
generally recognized that some remedy less onerous than the expectation
measure of damages is appropriate in the case of mistake or
impracticability.
Professor Wonnell observes that while expectation damages may be
fine for the normal efficient breach case, where courts may be unable to
determine whether the breach is efficient or not, in the case of a
disastrous change in circumstances, the probability of administrative
error is substantially reduced.", Expectation damages are not necessary
in impracticability cases to maintain incentives, or even appealing, as
57. Wonnell, supra note 4, at 77.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONmRACTS, ch. 11, introductory note, at 309.
59. 1& § 261 cmt. d.
60. Id. ch. 11, introductory note, at 311.
61. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of
Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L REv. 1443, 1444-45 (1980)
(making a case for supercompensatory damages based on difficulty of detection of
defects in performance and the high cost of pursuing litigation).
62. See Wonnell, supra note 4, at 108.
Professor Wonnell observes.63 Does that mean that the reliance measure
is appropriate? Why is the promisor less sympathetic than the promisee?
In the mistake cases, both parties were equally mistaken about the facts.
In the impracticability cases, both parties were the victims of external
circumstances. Why should either insure the other? Would it be best
simply to undo the deal by returning to each the benefit she has
conferred on the other, that is, restitution? Wonnell treats making "an
unconditional promise to the promisee" as a kind of fault,' thereby
justifying the reliance measure. Assigning liability for this behavior,
however, is more like strict liability than fault. There is no obvious
reason to make the promisor pay for the reliance damages that resulted."
It is very useful that Professor Wonnell has led us to ask what is the
appropriate remedy for imperfect transactions such as breaches of
contracts society does not want to enforce. His analytical approach is to
divide the question in two by considering the optimal incentives with
respect to two decisions, the decision to contract and the decision to
breach. His discussion in Part II attempts to "envision a remedy that
represents a kind of optimal trade-off' that balances incentives with
respect to both decisions.' Later in the article, he discusses optimizing
by using the pricing mechanism and judicial balancing to optimize
damages.67 Another solution, which does not require some joint
optimization, is to use the expectation measure for all contracts we wish
to enforce and find another measure for those we do not. As long as
63. Id. at 77.
64. Id. at 90.
65. Wonnell frequently analogizes to tort law when describing mistaken and
impractical promises. "[T]he reliance interest is ... a principled response to the tort of
entering into an obligation that purports to be binding but in fact is not because of the
unanticipated burden enforcement would entail." Id. at 102. In torts, however, strict
liability is not the norm. Strict liability may be justified where we can be fairly certain
that the liable person is best able to avoid the costs imposed. This is likely to be true for
harms caused by possessors of wild animals, people engaged in blasting, and
manufacturers of goods with manufacturing defects, but not by people who, along with
their contractual counterparts, have made mistakes of fact, or of people whose
performance is made impracticable by disastrous, externally imposed circumstances. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (strict liability for suppliers of
chattels); id. § 402B (strict liability for misrepresentation by sellers of chattels to
consumers); id. §§ 504-518 (1977) (liability of possessors of animals); id. §§ 519-524A
(liability for abnormally dangerous activities). See also DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A.
STOUT, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW 108-42 (1992) (describing economic
rationale for strict liability). In mistake, impracticability, and impossibility cases, this
justification does not apply. Moreover, the analogy to torts is not helpful to Professor
Wonnell's argument, since tort damages are calculated by the expectation measure of
damages rather than the reliance measure. See infra Part III (discussing Professor
Kelly's analysis of tort damages).
66. Wonnell, supra note 4, at 88.
67. Id. at 89-90.
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there is no game playing by breachers attempting to fool the court about
which type of contract we have, the question of appropriate remedy is
separate for each type of contract. Since we have a widely accepted
remedy for enforceable contracts, the expectation measure, that means
we just need to develop a unified theory of remedies for imperfect
transactions, including Professor Wonnell's cases of mutual mistake and
impracticability.
To my knowledge, a unified theory of remedies for imperfect
transactions does not exist. Professor Wonnell is attempting this task by
recommending joint optimization, but perhaps he is making the task too
hard for himself by looking at both decisions together. It might be more
fruitful to consider Cases 5 and 6 as examples of unenforceable contracts
like contracts against public policy, promises made under duress, and
promises made by people lacking capacity. Then we could consider
whether a single measure of damages, perhaps the reliance measure, fits
all of those. I think that would be a more logical structure for future
debates. Expectation is the measure of damages for breaches of
enforceable contracts. As was true for the promissory estoppel cases
discussed by Professor DeLong, Professor Wonnell's problem is finding
an appropriate remedy for breach of unenforceable promises.
IV. THE SIMILARITY OF TORT AND CONTRACT REMEDIES
Torts are the ultimate in imperfect transactions. Should they be
treated in the same way as breaches of enforceable contracts, or,
alternatively, as agreements we do not want to enforce? If the former,
the expectation measure of damages is appropriate. I agree completely
with Professor Kelly that the expectation measure is appropriate, but will
offer a different analogy between torts and breaches of enforceable
contracts and a different argument for why damages for tortious
behavior is identical to damages for breaches of enforceable contracts.
A. Torts as Breaches of Enforceable Contracts
Professor Kelly observes that tort damages, like contract damages, are
measured by the expectation interest.6 If the analogy of torts to
contracts is correct, a tort may be viewed as a breach of contract,
perhaps of a social contract. Breaches of the written parts of the social
68. See Kelly, supra note 7, at 170-71.
contract are breaches of the duties created by statutes. Failure to adhere
to customary measures adopted for the protection of others are breaches
of implied terms, analogous to a failure to follow ordinary business
practices. Negligence is a breach of the implied warranty that our
conduct will "pass without objection in the trade," be "of fair average
quality," and be "fit for the ordinary purposes" of interacting in society.69
Comparing this tort analogy to the Uniform Commercial Code's implied
warranty of merchantability, we can see that Kelly's rejection of the
reliance approach in torts is correct. As he points out, the reliance
measure asks us to consider what position the tort plaintiff would have
occupied if the defendant had no duty to behave in a particular way (for
example, no duty to stop at stop signs). This would be a silly inquiry in
torts because tort plaintiffs must prove that there the defendant did have
a duty and breached that duty in order to recover damages.
There is another sense in which it is silly to talk about the reliance
interest in torts. In contract law, we think of reliance damages as
expenses a promisee has incurred because of the other's promise. The
contract literature recognizes that these out-of-pocket expenses may be
incurred for the purpose of beginning one's performance 0 or for the
purpose of enhancing the benefit the promisee anticipated from the
other's performance.7' In torts, we do not find for this sort of reciprocal
behavior, unless the tort has contractual elements, as the tort of
misrepresentation does. We might say that a person buys a car or a
house "in reliance" on no one stealing or vandalizing it, but that is a
bizarre construction. I suppose I might have a healthy leg in reliance on
no one breaking it, but it is strange to think of my motivation for keeping
69. See U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a)-(c) (1989) (describing a breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability).
70. "Fuller and Perdue described these as 'essential reliance' costs. Their
terminology was adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 349 cmt. a (1981).
The term performance costs seems more straightforward and helps distinguish these
costs from other expenses incurred in reliance on the other's promise." David W.
Barnes, The Net Expectation Interest in Contract Damages, 48 EMORY L.J. 1137, 1147
n.31 (1999) (citation omitted).
71. These may be described as incidental (surplus-enhancing) reliance costs. See
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 35, at 78 (describing these as incidental reliance costs, a
confusing label given common use of the term incidental to describe another loss, the
costs incurred in arranging substitute transaction after a breach). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. c (1981) (including incidental losses as recoverable
damages and defining them). The Uniform Commercial Code employs a similar usage.
See U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (1989) (allowing buyer's recovery of incidental loss resulting
from seller's breach). The term surplus-enhancing reliance cost appears to have been
used first by Robert Cooter and Melvin A. Eisenberg. See Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1434, 1465 (1985)
(referring to "discretionary reliance by a contracting party that is undertaken to increase
the surplus over and above what he would enjoy had he simply done what was explicitly
or implicitly required under the contract").
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my legs fit that way. Tort damages are much more like the "incidentals
and consequentials" of section 347 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts.'
I have elsewhere contrasted the "curative" interest to the expectation,
reliance, and restitutionary interests commonly recognized in contract
remedies.73  This fourth interest is recognized only implicitly in
philosophical, theoretical, or conceptual treatments of contract damages.
A breach of contract may impose unanticipated costs on the
nonbreaching party, such as her costs of litigation, minimizing other
losses, liability to third parties with whom she has contracted, personal
injury, and property damage. These costs are distinguished from
reliance costs because the nonbreaching party had not anticipated
incurring them and would not have incurred them had there been no
breach. These are costs caused by the breach rather than in reliance on
the promise. Section 347 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts
distinguishes these costs from "cost[s] ... avoided" by including them
as "any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by
the breach."74  The amount of these breach-related costs" bears no
necessary relation to anything "contractual" (such as value of the
contract to either party, the cost of either party's performance, the
surplus-enhancing costs incurred by the promisee, or benefits received
by either party) and so fits the torts model quite nicely. From the
perspective of the expectation interest, another's imposition of breach-
related costs inevitably reduces the injured party's well-being. The other
must reimburse the injured party for those costs if the latter is to achieve
the improvement in well-being she anticipated. Tort damages do not
resemble reliance damages.
72. RESTATEMENT(SEcOND) OF CONTRAMc § 347(b) (1981).
73. Barnes, supra note 70, at 1149-50.
74. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347C0)-(c) (1981).
75. I prefer the term breach-related to consequential or incidental. The term
consequential customarily includes lost profits in both the Uniform Commercial Code
and commentaries. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1989) (defining consequential
damages as losses foreseeable to the seller which could not be prevented by cover)-
JAAES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUNsERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 268 (3d ed. 1988)
(explaining that the most common claim for consequential damages involves lost
profits). By contrast, in Restatement (Second) of Contracts, consequential damages are
costs imposed by the fact of the breach that would not have been incurred otherwise. See
RESTATEMNT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. c, illus. 4 (1981) (defining
consequential damages as injury to person or property resulting from defective
performance and offering as an example a defective machine that damages the injured
party's property).
Professor Kelly offers an explanation for why people want to import
what Kelly calls "tort's... [nonexistent] use of the reliance measure" to
16contracts. He suggests that those who would require reliance as a basis
for damages in contract are attracted to the harm requirement in torts and
antitrust, which may be viewed as a codified tort. He correctly states
that "[n]egligence liability does not exist unless the defendant's
negligence actually injures someone."' 7 The intentional torts, such as
assault, battery, trespass, and false imprisonment, however, do not
require harm to be actionable. Nominal damages are permitted, as in
contract, despite the lack of a harm.
Courts award damages for some tort theories despite the lack of harm
by recognizing a difference between harm and injury." An injury is an
invasion of a protected interest, such as the interest in being free from
harmful or offensive bodily contact. An intentional invasion of a
protected interest is actionable by itself, even if it is not accompanied by
a harm, a loss, or detriment in fact. A harm may result from another's
action even though no legally recognized interest is protected, but
without the invasion of a protected interest, courts allow no recovery. "
Recovery under intentional tort theories requires only an injury. It is
only for legal theories other than intentional torts that the plaintiff must
prove both an injury and a harm. Also, there is no harm requirement in
antitrust law as Professor Kelly suggests. There is only a requirement of
an injury. I had never thought of this requirement of proof of "antitrust
injury" as reflecting the tort definition of injury, but it does. Antitrust
injury, an injury of the kind antitrust law is designed to prevent, is a
prerequisite to receiving any damages or injunctive relief; however,
nominal damages are permitted without proof of harmW
76. Kelly, supra note 7, at 192.
77. Id. at 191.
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 7 (1965).
79. Id. cmts. a-d.
80. The source of the antitrust injury requirement is section 4 of the Clayton Act,
under which private individuals may bring actions for damages. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
Under this section:
[Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States... and shall recover three-fold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. § 15(a). In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), the
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs seeking treble damages under section 4 must show
more than simply an "injury causally linked" to a particular merger; instead, "[pilaintiffs
must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendants' acts unlawful."
Id. at 489. Nominal damages may be recovered if there is no actual injury proven. See,
e.g., United States Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 644 F. Supp. 1040, 1053
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (concluding that "[n]umerous federal courts have approved awards of
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There is no comparable distinction between intentional and negligent
breaches in contract law, since contract liability is strict liability.
Perhaps what Professor Kelly is suggesting is that people who wish to
import the reliance measure of damages from torts are doing so because
the closest analog between torts and contract is strict liability, in which
an injury and an actual harm are both required. But strict liability for
personal injury in torts, as for all tort theories, results in damages based
on the expectation interest. There is no area of torts that provides a close
analogy to the requirement of proof and the measure of damages
proposed by those preferring a reliance measure in contracts.
B. Measuring Tort Damages Using Contract Damage Rules
If tort damages are based on expectations, we might expect that the
rules governing contract remedies could be applied to breaches of the
social contract as to breaches of negotiated, private contracts. Section
347 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts supplies the "Measure of
Damages in General":
[T]he injured party has a right to damages based on his expectation interest as
measured by
(a) the loss in the value to him of the other party's performance caused by
its failure or deficiency, plus
(b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the
breach, less
(c) any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to perform.
To apply this rule to either tort or contract cases, we need to know what
"value" means in subparagraph (a). In some contexts, value means the
total benefits or revenues the promisor's performance would bring to the
promisee.2 Imagine a simple case in which there is no reliance and there
are no breach-related costs. Where the promisee anticipated earning
$20,000 in revenues from the promisor's performance and incurring
$17,000 in costs from the promisee's own performance, the surplus lost
nominal damages in antitrust cases" (citing Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial
Park Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d 1130, 1147 (8th Cir. 1981) (awarding S3 in nominal
damages))). See also M. Sean Royall, Disaggregation of Antitnst Damages, 65
ANU'TRtUST LJ. 311, 349 n.176 (1997) (citing Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Providence
Journal Co., 573 F. Supp. 1423, 1432 (D.R.I. 1983) (S3 in nominal damages); Knutson v.
Daily Review, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 226,240 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (S3 in nominal damages)).
81. RESTAEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981).
82. See Barnes, supra note 50, at 29 (discussing the meaning of value in various
contract damage rules).
due to breach is $3,000. Section 347(a) and (c) easily gives that result
by subtracting costs avoided, $17,000, from the anticipated revenues,
$20,000. Focusing on the surplus aids our understanding of the result.
Following section 347(b) and (c), respectively, breach-related costs and
reliance costs not "avoided" are added to the damages.
Value means something different from total revenues in a partial
performance case decided under the Restatement rules.83 When there is
partial or substitute performance, the injured party is awarded the
difference in value. This "value" does not mean "revenues," it means
the difference in the surplus earned between what was anticipated and
what was actually realized. For example, a promisee might substitute a
more profitable transaction for the breached contract, but would not be
awarded damages even though the breached contract would have
brought more "revenue." It is the bottom line, the surplus, that is
important in both types of cases. A surplus-based rule for contract
damages might appear as follows:
The Measure of Damages Generally: A Surplus-Based Approach
When a contract is not fully performed, an injured party may recover damages
as measured by the lost surplus, which is the difference between anticipated
surplus and actual surplus.
(a) The anticipated surplus of an injured party is the difference between
the revenues that party would have received and costs that party would
have incurred had the contract been fully performed.
(b) The actual surplus of an injured party is the difference between the
revenue the injured party received and costs the injured party incurred
because the contract was not fully performed.
This would always give the same damage award as the Restatement rule,
properly applied. How well do these rules work in torts?
The death of a tort victim offers the simplest analogy to a total breach
of contract. A single tort may cause damages to two classes of plaintiffs,
the decedent's estate and the decedent's dependent family. For the
survival action, brought by the decedent's estate, we could calculate an
expectation-based tort damage award by adapting section 347 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts as follows:
The injured party has a right to tort damages based on his expectation interest,
as measured by
(a) the loss in the value to the injured party of the other party's
performance caused by its failure or deficiency, i.e., the decrease in
revenues (lost earnings or earning capacity) and other benefits (hedonic
damages) the injured party would have obtained had he not died, plus
(b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by
83. Id. at 29-35. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347.
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the breach, i.e., medical expenses, pain and suffering, funeral expenses, and
other breach-related costs, less
(c) any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to perform.
i.e., savings from not having to support or maintain himself-his lifetime
consumption.
To put it in contract terms, a tort suit by the estate logically would end in
an award large enough to ensure that the estate would receive the
"profit" the decedent would have received. That lost profit or surplus is
the revenues and benefits ("loss in value") less costs of producing those
benefits (consumption expenses, which are "costs avoided"). The
surplus-based approach yields the same answer;, the difference between
anticipated surplus and actual surplus is what would have been revenue
and benefits "left over" after consumption expenses but for the accident.
Some states allow recovery of this surplus as part of the wrongful death
action (the action by the dependents) that accompanies the survival
action rather than as part of the survival action itself." Either way, the
award reflects an expectation rather than a reliance interest. The
fundamental principle in tort recovery is to put the plaintiff in the
position she would have occupied had the other acted reasonably, that is,
had not breached his social contract. This sounds suspiciously like
section 1-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code: "The remedies
provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end that the
aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had
fully performed ....
There are other parallels between Uniform Commercial Code article 2
damage remedies and tort remedies. Consider, for instance, section 2-
714(2), entitled "Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted
Goods," which allows buyers recovery of the difference between the
value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they
had been as warranted, plus incidental and consequential damages.t For
tort law purposes, section 2-714 would appear as follows:
84. Among the states that award this surplus as part of the wrongful death
recovery, some limit it to the amount of that excess that would have gone to support
dependents. This understates the expectation amount but in no way reflects what could
be considered a reliance interest. The other states award an amount that exactly reflects
the lost surplus, calling it a "loss of projected lifetime savings of the deceased." DANr B.
DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDiES § 8.3(2)-(3) (2d ed. 1993).
85. U.C.C. § 1-106 (1989).
86. Id § 2-714(2).
Torts Damages for Personal Injury
A party injured by another's breach of the social contract may recover the
(a) Value of Goods Accepted, that is, earning and enjoyment capacity of
torts plaintiff but for the injury; less the
(b) Value of Goods Received, that is, earning and enjoyment capacity of
torts plaintiff with the injury, plus
(c) Incidental and consequential damages including expenses reasonably
incurred in care and custody of goods received and injury to person or
property proximately resulting from any breach, that is, breach-related costs
such as medical expenses, funeral expenses, pain and suffering, etc.
If value is correctly interpreted as lost surplus, 7 the result of this
calculation is the same as a calculation based on section 347 or the
surplus approach, lost surplus plus breach-related costs.
Numerous other examples of recovery based on the expectation
interest are available from the remedies for different torts. For a
conversion, for instance, the plaintiff is entitled to the value of the
subject matter at the time and place of the conversion plus "the amount
of any further pecuniary loss of which the deprivation has been a legal
cause" and "compensation for the loss of use not otherwise
compensated."'  Conversion resembles a total breach of contract.
Trespass to chattels resembles a partial contractual performance.
Section 928 measures harm to chattels from a trespass that does not
amount to a conversion. The damages include compensation for:
(a) the difference between the value of the chattel before the harm and the
value after the harm or, at his election in an appropriate case, the reasonable
cost of repair or restoration, with due allowance for any difference between the
original value and the value after repairs, and
(b) the loss of use.
8 9
These remedies are forward-looking, reflecting the expectation interest,
rather than backward-looking, like the reliance measure of damages.
More evidence of the expectation basis for tort damages seems merely
cumulative. There are circumstances in which prospective economic
advantage is not awarded, such as cases where the tort has caused future
economic loss but neither physical harm nor property damage.' But the
87. Barnes, supra note 50 (explaining the correct interpretation of "value" in
measuring contract damages).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 927(b), (d) (1979).
89. Id. § 928.
90. See, e.g., People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d
107 (N.J. 1985).
The single characteristic that distinguishes parties in negligence suits whose
claims for economic losses have been regularly denied by American and
English courts from those who have recovered economic losses is, with respect
to the successful claimants, the fortuitous occurrence of physical harm or
property damage, however slight. It is well-accepted that a defendant who
negligently injures a plaintiff or his property may be liable for all proximately
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reason for denial of anticipated surplus reflects evidentiary concerns and
courts' desire to limit the number of prospective plaintiffs to whom a
defendant might be liable.9' In this regard, recovery of lost surplus is
treated like recovery of damages for emotional suffering unaccompanied
by physical harm.' In both areas, exceptions to the rule of nonrecovery
have emerged to bring these damage rules in line with the expectation
measure that would allow recovery of prospective surplus.'
The single area of torts for which Professor Kelly suggests an
alternative to expectation damages is misrepresentation. This is not
surprising, because an actionable misrepresentation in contracts must be
"likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent" or it must
be known to the maker of the misrepresentation "that it would be likely
to induce the recipient to do so."9' In torts, one who makes a fraudulent
misrepresentation is liable to those "whom he intends or has reason
to expect to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon the
misrepresentation." 95 Both legal actions are for imperfect transactions
involving fraudulent inducement of the other to respond in some way.
Both involve actions by the party that give rise to damages despite the
lack of an enforceable contract.
Without disputing Professor Kelly's conclusion that expectation
damages seem to be the customary response of courts in tortious
misrepresentation cases, it is hard to miss the similarity between
tortious misrepresentation and the cases of unenforceable contracts
discussed by Professors Wonnell and DeLong. There seems to be no
caused harm, including economic losses. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248
N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts §
129, at 997 (5th ed. 1984) (Prosser & Keeton). Nevertheless, a virtually per se
rule barring recovery for economic loss unless the negligent conduct also
caused physical harm has evolved throughout this century, based, in part, on
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 48 S. CL 134, 72 L Ed.
2d 290 (1927) and Cattle v. Stockton Watenvorks Co., 10 Q.B. 453 (1875).
I at 109.
91. Idat110.
92. See NV. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON ThE LAW OF TORTS 361
(5th ed. 1984) (describing the rule limiting recovery for emotional harm without
accompanying physical harm).
93. See People Express Airlines, Inc., 495 A.2d at 112-15 (reviewing exceptions
to denial of recovery for prospective economic advantage unaccompanied by physical
harm); KEETON Er AL., supra note 92, at 362-66 (describing exceptions to denial of
recovery for emotional harm unaccompanied by physical harm).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(2) (1981).
95. RESTATEiENT (SECOND) OFToRTS § 531 (1977).
96. Kelly, supra note 7, at 176.
coherent theory of remedies unifying all of these cases of imperfect
transactions as there is for breaches of enforceable contracts.
